Growth, technology and diffusion. A critical review by Garcimartín, Carlos
, 
Documento de Trabajo 9626 
GROWTH,TECHNOLOGY 
AND DIFFUSION_ 
A CRITICAL REVIEW 
D. CARLOS GARCIMARTIN 
Diciembre, 1.996 
2'9 
FACULTAD DE CIENCIAS ECONOMICAS y EMPRESARIALES 
UNIVERSIDAD COMPLUTENSE DE MADRID 
VICEDECANATO 
campus de Somosaguas. 28223 MADRID. ESPAÑA. 
CRECIMIENTO, TECNOLOGÍA Y DIFUSIÓN: UNA REVISIÓN CRITICA 
Carlos Garcimartín 
RESUMEN 
De acuerdo a la interpretación neoclásica del crecimiento, éste, en última instancia, 
sólo puede tener su origen en el aumento de los factores de producción. Sin embargo, cuando 
se procedió a aplicar esta metodología al análisis empírico, la mayor parte de los estudios 
encaminados a contabilizar el crecimiento, es decir, a asignar a cada factor su contribución 
al aumento del output, encontraron que una buena parte del mismo permanecía inexplicado. 
Aunque, en principio, ello debía obeceder al efecto, exógeno, del progreso técnico, en 
realidad, el porcentaje de crecimiento derivado del mismo parecía ser excesivo. Todo ello 
motivó que se realizaran una serie de críticas a la metodología utilizada, tanto en lo referente 
a su vertiente empírica como a sus fundamentos teóricos. En el presente trabajo se pretende 
llevar a cabo una revisión de dichas críticas así como de los estudios que las motivaron. 
Paralelamente, se analiza el papel jugado por la tecnología en los análisis sobre la dinámica 
económica. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Growth accounting exercises have beendevoted to identify 
the factors governing output and to measure their partial 
contributions to economic growth. The pioneering works on this 
topic were based on a neoclassical framework according to which 
most part of growth should be explained by changes in the amounts 
of capital and labour entering the production function. Yet, when 
growth accountants proceeded to estimate the share of the 
increase in output generated by those factors, they found that 
frequently it did not exceed fifty per cent. The unexplained 
share was what in the Solow's model was labelled ••• the 
residual!. Obviously, such an important determinant of growth did 
not deserve that name and, hence, growth accountants tried to 
reduce it, mainly by adding more components to the production 
function. 
The paper is divided in three parts. First section deals 
with the relation between Solow's model and growth accounting 
exercises. In addition, we summarize a list of problems stemming 
from growth accounting methodology. The second part comprises a 
review of the main explanatory variables added by growth 
accountants to the Solow's decomposition of growth. Finally, the 
th~rd part is devoted to what is the most elusive problem in this 
sort of analysis: technological progress. 
1. GROWTH ACCOUNTING ANO SOLOW'S GROWTH MODEL 
From its beginnings the aims of growth accounting have been 
to specify the sources of economic growth and to estimate the 
contribution of each factor to the expansion of output. Although 
some of the empirical research preceded a formal model, Solow's 
model of growth (Solow 1956) provided the theoretical framework 
to carry out these exercises. Therefore, we think that the best 
way to start this paper is by developing a brief summary of the 
1 
modelo 
Solow' s model follows the standard neoclassical assumptions 
such as perfect competition, perfect information, positive and 
decreasing marginal productivity for capital and labour, a 
constant returns to scale production function, etc. It is also 
assumed that the saving-output ratio is constant and, of course, 
that saving equals investment. The model predicts that in the 
long run all the variables grow at the same rate and, therefore, 
in equilibrium the growth rate of output per worker is zero. 
Then, one may wonder how is it possible to explain the growth of 
per capita income observed in many countries. The model explains 
this fact as the result of technical progress. Oisregarding this 
variable, in the way towards long run equilibrium output growth 
can be decomposed in a weighted sum of the increases in capital 
and labour. To see this, let us define the production function 
as 
« + 13 = 1, 
(1.1) 
where Y is output, L is labor, K is capital and subscript t stands 




= «dL +A dK 
L ti K' 
(1.2) 
Equation (1.2) says that the growth rate of output equals the 
growth rate of labor weighted by a plus the growth rate of capital 
weighted by (3. This is a good starting point to account for 
growth. However, we must first define a and (3. If the marginal 
income distribution theory holds, then we can write 
lThroughout this work we will denote time derivatives by a 








= I3Lu .z¡:1l-1, 
aK 
(1.4) 
where w and r are the rewards to labour and capital, respectively. 
Multiplying (1.3) by L and (1.4) by K and dividing both equations 
by Y, we get 




Therefore, a and pare the shares of labour and capital in 
national income (SL and SK' respectively). Substitution of (1.5) 
and (1.6) into (1.2) yields 
dY 
= SL dL + S dK 
Y L KK 
(1. 7) 
Equation (1.7) shows how a growth account can be carried out. 
First we calculate the output growth, then, we estimate the 
weighted sum of inputs growth, using as weights the inputs share 
in national income and, finally, we compute the difference between 
both magnitudes. This difference is named the residual and it 
stand s for technical progress. 
When this theoretical framework was applied to actual data, 
the results were amazing: only about a half the increase in output 
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was explained by the contribution of capital and labour 
(Abramovitz (1956), Solow (1957)). The residual should reflect 
technological progress but it was surprisingly large. This fact 
raised two main problems. On one hand, since technology is an 
exogenous variable, a major part of growth remained unexplained. 
On the other hand, according to neoclassical assumptions 
technology is a free good and, therefore, growth rates should show 
similar patterns across countries2 • 
Two ways were followed in order to reduce the residual. One 
was to embody technical progress as much as possible into the 
factors, adjusting them for quality compositions, etc. Anotherwas 
to add more factors to the production function. To the first 
approach belongs the work of Jorgenson and Griliches (1967) in 
which a deep adjustment in the measure of capital is implemented. 
Total stock of capital was corrected for biases in deflators and 
its components and adjusted by the rate of utilisation and by 
using the flow price of capital instead of its asset price. These 
mdtiifications forced the residual to vanish almost completely. 
Yet, they were dramatically reduced in ulterior studies after 
being s~verely criticized by Denison (1969) and Gordon (1969) who 
argued that capital was so overadjusted that if proper corrections 
were set up on other factors the residual could be negative. 
2Needless to say that growth rates across nations equalize 
once they have converged to their steady states, which 
according to the neoclassical theory is the same for all 
countries with the same population growth rate and depreciation 
rateo However, the speed of convergence in principie is quite 
high. See Barro and Sala i Martin (1990). 
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since the publication of Denison's pioneering work (Denison 
1967) the second approach became dominant among growth 
accountants3 and more explanatory variables were added in order to 
reduce the residual. Some of the new factors entering the 
production function are supposed to be systematic while others are 
ad-hoc and, hence, they do not apply to all nations and epochs. 
They range from changes in economic structure or a catching up 
bonus to economies of scale. However, although the inclusion of 
these factors has made possible to explain a larger part of 
growth, this part does not exceed on average 75% of total growth 
and for some countries in some periods it is no more than 50%. For 
example, Denison (1979) ascribes 15% of the US average growth 
during the period 1948-1973 to an increase in capital and another 
15% to changes in employment and working hours¡ fourteen per cent 
is credited to increased capabilities of workers¡ improvement in 
resources allocation contributed 10% and economies of scale 11% 
while changes in legal and human environment reduced growth by 2%. 
Th~ residual, 37%, was the result of technical advances. Thus, 
despite the inclusion of others variables, technology was still by 
far the most important single source of economic growth. 
To these factors or variables will be devoted the next 
section of the paper but first let us expound some remarks on 
growth accounting methodology. 
3Among others, it has be en undertaken by Denison (1967, 
1979), Kendrick (1981) and Maddison (1987). 
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1.1 The measurement of output4 
As pointed out by Griliches (1979) the definition of output 
is a crucial point in growth accounting exercises because their 
results and conclusions change according to the measurement of 
production. In other words, it is not the same to consider 
production as GNP, as the change in national wealth or as a 
broader concept of economic welfare. For instance, a large part of 
the impact of technical progress on output is not included in 
national accounts as usually measured and, therefore, its 
contribution to growth is underestimated. 
This problem has never been seriously considered by growth 
accountants. In their analysis they usually measure output as some 
aggregate of national accounts in which housing and government 
sectors are often excluded due to their limited character of 
market pricing. Thus, Denison (1967) uses net national product at 
factor cost, Kendrick (1981) uses private gross domestic product 
¡ 
at'\factor cost and Maddison (1987) uses gross domestic product at 
factor costo 
1.2 Factor shares. 
The lack of consensus on the measure of output raises 
4Deliberately we do not deal with the problem of the 
measurement of capital. First, because it has already be en 
mentioned within growth accounting framework and, second, because 
it would drive us to the strong controversy that took place 
between the two Cambridges some decades ago and this issue goes 
beyond the scope of the papero 
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another problem: since it serves as denominator for the estimate 
of factor weights, it influences the contribution to growth of 
each factor and the size of the residual. Thus, the weight of 
capital ranges from 23% in Denison's works to 39% in Helliwell, 
sturm and Salou (1985)5. 
However, the problem concerning factor shares is deeper than 
merely one of definition of output and inputs. As pointed out by 
Nelson (1973), the crucial question is the difficulty to 
distinguish between alternative explanations of growth without 
strong a priori assumptions. Growth accounting exercises have not 
proceeded by trying to specify a particular production function 
and estimate its parameters but by building up an input index that 
measures the contribution of input quantity. The weights given to 
the inputs rest on assumptions about factor shares that cause two 
sorts of problems when trying to explain growth. One is quite 
obvious: since weights are calculated as factor shares in total 
output, then, their sum can not be greater than one and, 
therefore, in principIe increasing returns to scale are not 
allowed. The second problem refers to the moment in which shares 
, 
should be calculated because they change over time due to changes 
in factor ratios and technological progress. Moreover, if we want 
to attribute to input s growth only what output growth would have 
been had technology not changed, then, we should use the time path 
of shares as they would have been had technology been constant 
5It must be noticed that such a big difference is not only 
the result of the measurement of output but also of the 
measurement of capital. Helliwell, sturm and salou include 
consumer durables, raising, therefore, the capital share. 
7 




A LL KK' 
dY* dY 
(1. 8) 
where Y, L, K, SK and SLhave the usual meaning and A stands for 
the stock of knowledge. Then, the growth of output had technology 
not changed is 
T 
lOg'Y*<Tl-IogY*(Ol=[(SLCtl dlO~~(t) +8x (t) dlO~~(t) )dt, 
»,,', ",n'{n"n" (1.9) 
should be Si (K/L(t) A(O» (i=L,K) instead 
of factor s 
Denison's approach most growth accountants have 
new determinants of growth to their studies: catching up, 
economies of scale, etc. since those variables are interdependent, 
j 
tH'is methodology faces a problem of causali ty, as i t has been 
emphasized by Nelson (1964 and 1973), Matthews (1969), Maddison 
(1987) and Fagerberg (1992). A classical source of interdependence 
is that between technology and capital. If technology is embodied 
in new capital goods, then, capital accumulation increases the 
impact of technical progress on growth. Many other interactions 
may exist as is the case for economies of scale and structural 
change, being difficult to identify the contribution of each 
individual factor to growth. 
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Indeed, Nelson (1973) shows that the relative attribution to 
different factors is not independent of the time period considered 
and, hence, it is not possible to know how much actual growth is 
attributable to capital or to labour or to technology. In other 
words, the percentage of growth explained by, let us say, 
technology depends on the evolution of capital and labour. 
To see this, let us call AK and AL the instantaneous growth 
rates associated with the yearly growth rates of capital and 
labour, respectively, and AA the instantaneous rate of 
technological progress estimated by the Solow I s method. If by 
attribution to a factor we mean output growth that would have 
occurred had only that factor changed, then, in the case of 
infinitesimal changes it is possible to calculate the attribution 
of each factor to total growth. But now consider a finite time 











From (1.15) and (1.16 ) we can obtain the following ratio 
Attribution to Technical Progress _ e AAT_1 
Total Growth e (A ... ,,+ALSL+·A) T_ 1 . 
This express ion shows that the percentage of output growth 
generated by technical change depends on T. This is because the 
efficiency of one factor is sensitive to changes in other factors 
(here time is related to changes in factors). In other words, the 
percentage of the expansion of output explained by any particular 
factor is linked to the evolution of all inputs. As Nelson points 
out, the problem is the same one that plagued the profession many 
years ago when it was trying to attribute total product between 
the different factors. We learnt that it was impossible. We could 
attribute at the margino But there was no way to attribute shares 
of the total (Nelson 1973, p. 465). 
To sum up, the question of interdependence is a crucial one 
for growth accounting. If the interactions existing among 
variab17s are very strong, the decompositions of growth carried 
out in these studies as well as their conclusions may rest on a 
shaky ground. 
1.4 The accounting identity and Kaldorian stylised facts 
As we have already noted, growth accounting exercises showed 
that the percentage of growth explained by technical advance was 
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surprisingly large. Yet, Thirlwall and McCombie (1994) have argued 
that this result far from being surprising is the logic 
consequence of a wrong methodology. Following Shaikh (1980), they 
argue that the estimates of the aggregate production function 
reflect merely an underlying accounting identity. To see this, let 
us define the value of total output as 
(1.16) 
where Y, w, L, r, k, and t have the usual meanings. Taking logs 
and time derivatives we get 
dY,,'P. + a dL + (1-a) dk, 
y • t L k 
(1,17) 
where 
'P"a t dw + (1-a) dr, w r (1.18) 
being a labour's share in total output. Under the assumption that 
epmay be taken to approximate to a constante rate, integrating 
(1.17) with respect to time we obtain 
(1.19) 
where Aa is a constant. Comparing this equation with the Cobb-
Douglas production function we see that technical progress (A) is 
formally equivalent to ep, defined as aboye. 
The so-called Kaldorian stylised facts of growth are the 
basic assumptions of the demonstration. This propositions are the 
following: 
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(i) factor shares are constant, and 
(ii) the rental price of capital is constant. 
Then, if the assumptions hold we get 
dY )"=cp=a(-y dL) • L 
(1. 20) 
since a takes a value of about 0,75, it follows that 
technology must explain 75% of the increase of output per worker. 
If, in addition, labour growth is small, then, technical progress 
must explain a great deal of output growth. In other words, it is 
no surprising that using growth accounting methodology we find 
such a large residual. 
2. SUPPLEMENTARY VARIABLES ADDITIONAL TO CAPITAL ANO LABOUR 
2.1 Externalities and economies of scale 
Denison (1962) estimated that economies of scale contributed 
to growth by about 9% and a similar percentage is found in other 
studies (Kendrick (1981), Maddison (1987». Indeed, he emphasized 
the relevance of this factor to explain the high growth rates 
experienced by Japan in comparison with other countries. 
However, the introduction of economies of scale in growth 
accounting exercises raises a very important problem. If an 
increasing returns to scale (IRS) production function is 
postulated we run into trouble since it is not possible to find a 
set of prices to support a general competitive equilibrium. One 
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way to get around this problem was already mentioned by Marshall 
and it consists of introducing IRS at the aggregate level but 
constant returns to scale (CRS) at the firm level. Each firm's 
performance affects all other firms production but none of them 
take this into account. Thus, economies of scale are formulated 
through externalities or spillovers. As it is well known, under 
this conditions the competitive equilibrium solution is not 
optimal, since the rate of investment falls below its social 
optimal level. 
Romer (1987) argues that a large positive externality is 
necessary to explain the strong positive relation existing between 
the residual and the capital stock across countries and epochs. He 
also suggests that the social marginal productivity of this factor 
is about two or three times its private marginal productivity and, 
therefore, as we have mentioned above, the equilibrium level of 
investment falls short of its social optimal level. Yet, Jovanovic 
arl.d Benhabib (1991) assert that under plausible assumptions there 
is no support for capital externalities. They show that different 
growth rates among countries are consistent with a cornmon CARS 
production function and with a cornmon stochastic process for 
technological change starting from different initial positions. 
They build a model of the type 
(2.1) 
where log (~) follows an ARMA (1,2) process. The parameter 8 
represents the external effect from K. It is important to notice 
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that the individual firm ignores the presence of ~ in its 
production function, so the competitive solution is permitted. 
Looking at the postwar US data, they find that 8 is not 
significantly different from zero. 
However, to test for externalities and economies of scaleat 
a high level of aggregation may cause serious mistakes, since they 
may mask each other. Caballero and Lyons (1989 a and b) have 
emphasized this point using a model in which total factor 
productivity is linked to other firms production (externalities) 
and to technological progress, allowing for possible increasing 
returns to scale. Then, the production function of the 
representative firm is 
(2.2) 
where L, K and Y have their usual meaning, E stands for an 
externalities index and V is a technology indexo Taking logs and 
derivatives with respect to time we get 
dy = 
y 
a.dL + J3dK + dE + dV 
L K E V (2.3) 
Under the assumption that firms face a downward slope demand 
with a price elasticity ~, if we maximize the profit function with 







~ = IX 
PY(l+2:.) 
1] (2.5) 
where p is the va1ue added price, w refers to wage and r stands 
for the price of capital services. 
(2.5) into (2.3) yie1ds 
dY 
= y 











For convenience and without any 10ss of genera1ity we can consider 
the case where dL/L = dK/K = dX/X. Then, we can rewrite (2.6)as 
dY 
= y 
wL + IX 
PY(l+1:.) 
1] 
dX + dE 




Therefore, the decomposition of growth carried out by Caballero 
and Lyons inc1udes Solow's decomposition as a specia1 case where 
(wL+rK)/(pY) = 1, constant returns to sca1e, (1+1/~) = 1, perfect 
competition, and E = O, no externa1ities. 
" 
To see the prob1eros stemming froro working at an aggregate 
1eve1 1et us define the growth rate of the externa1ities received 
by the firro as 
dEij = 
E 
dYi a·--~ y 
i 
+ b dY , 
Y 
j=1. .n, i=l .. m 
(2.8) 
where subscript j refers to the firro and subscript i refers to he 
sector. Thus, the firm j benefits from its sector externa1ities 
and froro other sectors externa1ities. Substitution of (2.8) into 
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(2.7) yields 





where 'Y¡ mea sures the ecinomies of scale of sector i. Equation 
(2.9) says that the firms benefits from possible economies of 
scale (~), from the production of firms belonging to its sector 
(a¡), from other sectors output (b) and from technical progress. 
The problems to estimate the parameters of (2.9) arise when one 
wants to perform the regression at a higher level of aggregation. 
Assuming that the production shares are equal to the input shares, 
if we mul tiply both sides of (2. 9) by Ój. the share of 
firm j in the output of sector i and integrate over j, we get 
dYi 
= 
dXi + dYi + b dY + dV Y1-- a·-- , Yi Xi ~ Y Y v i (2.10) 
and rearranging terms 
I 
dYi 
= Y dXi + b dy + 1 dV Yi l-ai Xi 1-a. Y 1-ai V· ~ (2.11) 
Therefore, the estimate of the parameter relating inputs to 
output will be biased, as well as those referring to the output of 
other sectors and technology. The higher is the aggregationlevel 
the larger is the bias. For example, when inputs raisethey 
generate two effects on the output of the sector, a direct one 
derived from the use of more inputs and an indirect one derived 
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from the intra-sector externalities caused by the increase in the 
output of firms. Yet, we attribute to inputs the total output 
growth such as to account for possible economies of scale what 
really should be accounted for intra-sector externalities. 
Addi tionally , in this example i t is easy to see the problems 
mentioned above stemming from the interdependence of factors. When 
input s raise so does output but we can no attribute total output 
growth to the increase in inputs because externalities contribute 
to output growth. But, in fact, if externalities come into play it 
is because inputs have previously increased, so, its contribution 
is not independent from the evolution of inputs. 
To sum up, in order to test for externalities and economies 
of scale is more convenable to work at a low aggregation level. 
Caballero and Lyons found that if inputs increased 100% in an 
individual sector of US manufactures, the output only raised by 
80%, while if all sectors raised their inputs by 100%, the output 
increased 130%. In other words, they found decreasing returns to 
scale at a sectoral level and increasing returns at a higher 
aggregation level, confirming, according to them, the presence of 
externalities in US manufactures. Yet, as pointed out by Amable 
and Guellec (1992), it is also possible to explain this result as 
a consequence of Keynesian mechanisms: changes in the aggregate 
demand and in the inputs utilization rateo 
2.1 The catch-up bonus 
The addition of a catch-up variable is a common practice in 
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growth accounting studies, playing an important role in Denison 
(1962, 1967), Helliwell, Sturm and Salou (1985) and Maddison 
(1987). 
Firs of all, it is important to stress the difference 
existing between the catching up argument and the neoclassical 
case of transitional dynamics. Both predict convergence across 
countries but due to different reasons. In the neoclassical theory 
of growth convergence occurs because capital producti vi ty is 
higher in less developed countries than in industrialized 
countries while catching up approach explains convergence as a 
result of technology transfer from rich to poor countries. In both 
cases GDP per cap ita is supposed to be negatively correlated with 
growth rates but while in empirical works based on the 
neoclassical theory it serves as a proxy for capital-labour ratio, 
studies on catching up use it as a proxy for technological level. 
The catch-up argument was developed by economic historians 
sulii:h as Gerschenkron (1962), Maddison (1979) and Abramovitz 
(1986). In a celebrated article, Baumol (1986) tested for catch-up 
across q sample of sixteen countries during the period 1870-1970. 
He found that a large part of differences in economic growth could 
be explained by means of a catch-up variable. In fact, this factor 
seemed to have such a high explanatory power as to make growth 
irrespective to the level of investment. As Baumol assessed, 
whatever its behaviour, that nation was apparently fated to land 
close to its predestined position (Baumol 1986 p. 1077). Moreover, 
not only among the market industrialized countries had convergence 
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occurred but also among the centrally-planned economies. 
De Long (1988) criticized strongly Baumol's work arguing that 
he used an ex-post sample of countries and therefore convergence 
, 
was guaranteed. In other words, Baumol's regression was forced to 
show convergence because any nation relatively rich in 1870 that 
had not converged was excluded from the sample¡ for instance, 
Norway is included but not spain. Furthermore, the estimation 
technique used by Baumol (OLS) was not satisfactory because of 
error s in measuring 1870 incomes. Such errors generate opposite 
errors in the magnitudes of growth, biasing the regression slope 
towards one. De Long carries out a regression using an ex-ante 
sample, countries that were likely to converge in 1870, and he 
finds that convergence had not occurred. A relative high income in 
1870 was not a sufficient condition to exploit the potentials of 
catching up. 
This idea was already present in most part of historians who 
initiated this work. They emphasized the important role played by 
economic, social and institutional factor s in the catching up 
process: Abramovitz (1986) coined the concept social capabilities 
which is referred to the necessary conditions to assimilate modern 
technology. Following an approach influenced by Schumpeter, 
Justman and Tebal (1991) argue that a structural change in the 
economy is necessary in order to generate and assimilate 
technology and this change is not guaranteed by the market. Quite 
to the contrary, structural change is conditioned to experience, 
technological capabilities, specific infrastructure, an adequate 
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supply of entrepreneurs and a large and sophisticated local 
market. To some extent, a country may ent.er a vicious circle, 
since technological progress is related to new capabilities and 
these are related to functioning routine. This last argument was 
introduced in the literature by Young (1928) and it refers to some 
kind of dynamic economies of scale. According to him, both, the 
division of labour and the extension of the market are 
interdependent. This means that present growth, related to a 
market enlargement, generates a greater division of labour, which 
raise its productivity, thus, creating new opportunities to extend 
the market. Some years later Myrdal (1957) following this idea 
coined the concept cumulative causation, according to which, 
success brings success and failure brings failure. Technological 
innovation and diffusion depends positively on the development 
level of the country and on its rate of growth. Therefore, 
convergence is far from being guaranteed. 
The difficulties to model social capabilities explain the 
¡ 
scarcity of attempts to test them. Additionally, one runs the risk 
of misunderstanding the results. De Long himself finds that, 
according to statistical tests, being or not being a protestant 
country is crucial for economic growth. Obviously he takes this 
result only as a rough demonstration of the relevance of social 
condi tions. However, most studies tackle the problem by using 
education and investment as proxies for human capital and efforts 
to close the gap, respectively6. Generally speaking, both 
variables seem to have a significant influence on growth, 
6See Cornwall (1976), Barro (1989) and Lindbeck (1983). 
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although it must be noted that they are highly correlated to each 
other. 
A very different theoretical framework has been followed by 
the so called "technological gap approach." According to it, 
technology must be introduced in the model so as to permit not 
only convergence but also divergence. Following Schumpeter, growth 
is regarded as the result of two conflicting forces, both of them 
related to technology. On one hand, innovation, which tends to 
increase the differences in income per head across countries. On 
the other hand, imitation, which tends to close the income gap. 
Therefore, an innovation variable should be included in the models 
explaining growth. Fagerberg (1991) builds a model including 
potential for imitation, efforts to close the gap and innovation 
activity as explanatory variables. It explains a large part of the 
differences in growth among the sample of countries, although 
innovation activity (proxied by patents) does not seem to affect 
gr\)wth for the OECD area after 1973 and for the medium sized 
developed countries included in the sample it has not any effect 
all over the periodo Similar models have been developed by 
, 
Verspagen (1991) and Amable (1993). 
However, most of these studies test for convergence at a high 
level of aggregation and, as noted by Dollar and Wolf (1988), this 
may be inappropriate. A regression restricted to GDP level may 
explain convergence as the result of catch-up while the true 
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explanation may be something else¡ for instance, structural 
change7. Besides, the potential for catching up may vary across 
sectors since they have different rates of technical progress. 
Furthermore, if the diffusion of technology is related to trade it 
may follow different patterns across sectors since their degree 
of international tradability differs. Dowrick and Gemmel (1991) 
carried out a study across a sample of countries during the period 
1960-1985 and they did not find any evidence for catching up in 
agriculture while it existed in non agricultural sectors. Hansson 
and Henrekson (1994) suggest that in the OECD area during the 
period 1979-1985, catch-up only occurred for non tradables because 
the diffusion of technology in tradables was almost depleted in 
the early 1970s. 
Another important nuance has been pointed out by Dowrick and 
Nguyen (1989) and Hansson and Herekson (1994). They assert that 
there is a crucial difference between convergence in income per 
capita or labour productivity and any tendency for catching up in 
levels of total factor productivity (TFP). Thus, in order to test 
for catching up, Dowrick and Nguyen use a regression of the forro 
(2.12) 
where q ,k and 1 are, respectively, the rates of growth of output, 
7If the composition of output changes as it grows and 
branches growing in relative terms face a relative low 
productivity growth, then, present growth implies a future 
slowdown. In this case, convergence occurs thanks to this 
coroposition effect and not to catching up. (See next section). 
23 
capital and labour¡ y* is the ratio of labour productivity in 
country i to labour productivity in the. leader country and 
subscripts i and t refer to country and time, respectively. The 
results support catching up in the OECD area as well as in other 
countries, exception made of nations with a low investment ratio 
or high growing populations. 
We can conclude this section by saying that catching up is 
not only a controversial topic but also a very important one. If 
it exists, it must be taken into account when comparing across 
countries the effects of economic policies on growth. 
2.3 structural Change 
structural change has accompanied economic growth in all 
countries. It is well known that some sectors and branches have 
increased their share in national output while others have 
e~perienced a relative decline. This process is the result both 
'I,I~ 
from changes in demand and from the evolution of productivity. 
, 
The different income elasticities for particular products 
tend to raise the share of some sectors and branches. Other things 
egual, structural change would have no effect upon growth. Yet, 
since the productivity of labour varies across sectors, changes in 
the sectoral composition of employment have deep consequences on 
growth. Historically, agriculture has be en a low-productivity 
sector in relation to industry. Therefore, the flow of workers 
from the former to the latter has fostered growth. Subsequently, 
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the increase in income occurred during the last decades together 
with the high income elasticity of services have diverted 
resources to this sector, hindering growth given its low 
productivity in comparison with industry. 
As we mentioned in the previous section, this composition 
effect may to some extent explain why growth rates differ across 
countries, allowing, in principIe, for both, convergence and 
divergence. Additionally, we must stress a crucial implication of 
this effect: it questions the validity of the traditional one 
sector models. To understand the force s governing growth may be 
inappropriate to rely on models that really only describe the path 
followed by one sector. If different sectors follow different 
paths and growth implies structural change, then, the growth path 
followed by the economy as a whole is not unique. To take this 
into account would help us to understand why in some periods 
and/or countries economic growth speeds up while in others a 
slowdown occurs. 
Th~ structural change effect is present in most growth 
accounting exercises. It is usually measured by calculating the 
presumed increase in output had not employment structure changed8 • 
In other words, first we compute the growth of output per worker 
in each sector, then, using this figures we calculate the sectoral 
output growth would have occurred had employment distribution 
8See , for example, Denison (1967), Kendrick (1981) or 
Maddison (1987). 
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among sectors been constant, and, finally, we estimate the total 
output growth would have been had sectoral output grown at the 
previously computed rate and not at its actual rateo The 
difference between these two figures is supposed to be due to the 
structural change effect, which can be either positive or 
negative. 
Some other explanatory variables, like foreign trade effect, 
costs of governmental regulation or discovery of natural 
resources, have been included in growth accounting exercises. 
However, they neither play an important role nor are present in 
all works. Hence, we shall not deal with them. 
3. TECHNOLOGY 
In Solow's model technology is assumed to grow at a constant 
" exogenous rate and to be a free good from which any country can 
benefit. This approach was criticized because it does not take 
into acéount the relation existing between capital accumulation 
and technology. Investment in new machines is a necessary 
condi tion for technical progress to take place since technology is 
usually embodied in capital goods. However, Phelps (1962) showed 
that the introduction of embodied technical progress in Solow's 
model did not change its main characteristics: the steady state 
growth depends on the total rate of technical progress but it is 
independent of the fraction of embodiment of technology. This is 
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not the case for the speed of adjustment, which does depend on the 
fraction of embodied progress. Therefore, to distinguish between 
embodied and disembodied technical progress seems to be irrelevant 
when dealing with long run issues but it is important when 
studying short run dynamics. 
Endogenous versus exogenous productivity growth 
Indeed, a radical departure from Solow' s model forced to drop 
at least one of its two main assumptions about technology: its 
"public" character and its exogenous character. This is what 
Kaldor and Mirlees (1962), Kaldor (1957) and Arrow (1962) did. 
They tried to endogenize technical progress by relating 
productivity to experience. 
In an attempt to explain the low growth rates of the united 
Kingdom in comparison to other countries, Kaldor (1966) introduced 
some ideas in the literature of growth, which eventually became to 
¡ 
be\known as Kaldor's laws. The first of them asserts that the 
" higher is the rate of growth of industry the higher is the rate of 
growth 9f the whole economy. It is important to note that this 
relation is not due to the large weight of this sector in total 
output but to the fact that the growth of industry induces other 
sectors to grow, so industry generates some kind of externalities, 
which do not exist from, let us say, services to the rest of the 
economy. Kaldor tested GNP growth on manufactures growth using a 
sample of twelve developed countries over the period 1952-1964 and 
he found a value of the parameter of 0,614, i.e. an increase in 
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manufactures generated a more than proportionally to its weight 
increase in total output. This relation was rejected for 
agriculture or mining9. Therefore, conversely to the traditional 
approach, the first of Kaldor's laws showed that it is not 
irrelevant where growth takes place. 
The second law was originally introduced in the literature by 
Verdoorn (1949). Leaving Solow's approach, technical progress is 
to a certain extent considered a consequence of growth itself so 
as to exist a cumulative process: growth generates future growth. 
According to Kaldor, knowledge increases as output raises because 
of a learning by doing process, which role had already been 
confirmed in some learning function studies at a firm level 
(Alchian (1963), Hirsh(1952) and Rapping (1965». This second law 
was tested among others by Verdoorn (1949), Kaldor (1966), Kennedy 
(1971), cripps and Tarling (1973) and Cornwall (1976), mainly by 
using a regression of the form 
dp=a+b dy 
p y 
( 3 • 1 ) 
where dp/p stands for the rate of growth of productivity and dy/y 
is the rate of growth of output. In all of these works the 
coefficient linking production to productivity was found 
significant and ranking between zero and one, thus, supporting 
9The law was al so supported in subsequent studies. See, for 
example, Cripps and Tarling (1973) or Thirlwall (1980). 
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Kaldor-Verdoorn' s law and avoiding explosi ve paths1o • 
However, the law was severely criticised because of two main 
problems. The first one refers to the instability of the value of 
the parameter b across countries and over time. Rowthorn, using a 
different specification, (1975) found that if Japan was excluded 
from the sample in the mentioned works b was not statistically 
different from zero. Additionally, its value turned out to be very 
sensitive to the sample period¡ see, for example, Boyer and Petit 
(1891). The second problems deals with the direction of causality. 
According to Salter (1960), it is an autonomous increase in 
productivity that causes the output growth rather than the 
opposite case. Kaldor himself argued that the fact that 
productivity growth in a particular industry varies across 
countries in the same period supports the idea that it depends on 
the activity level of the country, reinforcing the causality from 
output growth to productivity growth. Some empirical studies have 
confirmed Kaldor's opinionll • 
As pointed out by Boyer and Petit (1981), the Kaldor-
Verdoorn's law seems the reduced form of a structural equation, 
IOIf the coefficient b is greater than one the economy will 
follow a explosive path. As output grows in period t it generates 
a new amount of knowledge which will drive output to grow in t+1 
at a higher rate than in t. Therefore, the rate of growth will 
tend to infinity, which does not seem to be a very realistic 
path. 
IISee Parikh (1978) and McCombie and de Ridder (1983). It is 
also interesting to mention the study carried out by 
Griliches (1957) about the diffusion of the hybrid corn in the 
USo He concludes that an increase in demand implies a greater 
diffusion of new technology, which, to some extent, could explain 
Kaldor-Verdoon's Law. 
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which needs to be made explicito An increase in labour 
productivity as output raises may be the consequence of an 
increase in capital, so no total factor productivity effect 
occurs. Bearing in mind this remark, Michl (1985) regressed the 
increase in labour productivity on output growth and capital 
growth, adding a variable for catching up. He found that all three 
were significative, so output growth had a separate effect on 
labour producti vi ty. Another interesting resul t was that the 
intercept was not significatively different from zero, which means 
that no autonomous technological progress occurred. 
An important implication of Kaldor's approach was the role 
given to demand, absent in the traditional approach. As demand 
increases (Kaldor himself stressed the relevance of exports as a 
part of total demand) it affects positively not only output but 
also productivity. Parikh (1978) suggested a four equations model 
in which productivity depends on growth, which, in turn, depends 
on exports. According to him, the results confirmed the idea that 
growth is not labour constrained, as it is in the neoclassical 
approach, but exports constrainedl2 • 
Recently, within the framework of endogenous growth 
literature, sorne models conceiving knowledge as a by-product of 
economic activity have been developed. See, for example, Grossman 
and Helpman (1990), Romer (1986) and Lucas (1988). Despite of all, 
this view of technical progress has in cornmon with Solow's model 
12See Thirlwall and McCombie (1994) for an exposition of 
balance of payrnent constraint growth models. 
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the idea that nothing can be done by the firm to increase its 
level of technology. In Solow's model, firms just wait for an 
increase in its technical level, which occurs periodically and at 
the same rate. In Kaldor-Verdoorn' s approach technical progress is 
in fact a by-product of growth. When output increases every 
industry and firm can in principIe benefit from this side effect 
but no resources are expressly devoted to make better the 
techniques in use. 
Research and deve10pment investment 
Yet, we have seen when we dealt with catching up that the 
free technology diffusion assumed in Solow's model is far from 
being guaranteed. Therefore, if there is some degree of 
appropiability of technology, there is no reason to expect firms 
not to devote resources to increase it. In fact, the main 
conclusion emerging from studies relating R&D and productivity is 
that both variables are positively relatedl3 , although, as in 
other topics on growth accounting, we face some methodological 
problems when trying to estimate the contribution of R&D to 
growth. ,In this sense, we have already noted that the definition 
of final output is crucial. Griliches (1979) has pointed out that 
one of the main obstacles to measure the contribution of R&D to 
growth is the fact that much of it is performed in industries 
whose product is badly measured, like defense or health. The 
problem is more complex wi th new and improved products so Id 
directly to consumers, since advances in quality are not included 
13For a survey see Griliches (1991). 
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in price indices. He mentions the case of computers whose "real 
price" fell by about 20% in the seventies. since this decline was 
not reflected in price indices, the estimates of output and 
productivity growth were seriously biased. 
The special feature that distinguishes technology from other 
input s is its non rival character: its use by one firm in no way 
limits its use by other firms. This fact makes difficult for firms 
to appropriate technology, generating two opposite force s for its 
increase. If appropriability is too high, there may be redundant 
resources devoted to R&D and it is more expensive for the firm to 
conduct R&D investment for it only counts with its own technology 
stock. Therefore appropriability hinders R&D investment. But, on 
the other hand, if appropriability is too low, firms may have no 
incentives to invest because of free rider problems. However, as 
pointed out by Rosenberg (1974) and Nelson (1982), the trade off 
between incentives (high appropiability) and spillovers (free 
technological diffusion) may be overstated. They argue that in 
order to benefit from spillovers is necessary to invest in R&D. 
Hence, spillovers may incentive rather than disincentive R&D 
investmént. Mansfield, Schmartz and Wagner (1981) found that for 
US electronics, machinery and drugs industry there is a clear 
trade off between imitation time and imitation costo They also 
found that patent system only was effective as a protection 
mechanism for a 25% of patented inventions. Therefore, the study 
support the idea that spillovers and own R&D investment are, to 
some extent, complementary. 
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To combine R&D expenditures with spillovers rises the 
possibilities to get endogenous growth. As firms invest in R&D, 
they increase the stock of knowledge, which, in turn and thanks to 
spillovers, reduces the cost of investment in R&D. This is the 
approach followed by Grossman and Helpman (1989a,b and 1991). In 
these models R&D has a public component (spillovers) as well as a 
private component. While the latter fosters R&D projects, the 
former facilitates subsequent research. However, sustained growth 
is guaranteed in these models because there are constant returns 
to investing to R&D. Englander, Evenson and Hanazaki (1988) follow 
a different approach. Using a Schumpeterian framework, in the 
sense that opportunities to innovate are not constant over time, 
they relate R&D potency to the stock and growth of knowledge and 
techniques available to conduct R&D. If this stock is fixed, R&D 
will face decreasing returns but if new inventions are developed, 
the stock increases and invention potential is replenished. In 
other words, if the rate of exhaustion of the stock exceeds its 
rate of replenishment, potency is said to decline. In their 
empirical research they use ratios of inventions per unit of R&D 
expenditure and per unit of R&D personnel. They find that the 
efficiency of R&D is not constant over time. Moreover, they also 
find strong divergences across sectors, which, according to them, 
could explain the uneven evolution of inflation in manufacturing 
and service industries. Since other studies (Schankerman and Pakes 
(1985» have argued that the average quality of patents has 
increased over time and hence it is not possible to assert that 
R&D potency has declined, they proceed to estimate the effect of 
R&D on total factor productivity. First they calculate the flows 
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of technology across industries by computing the proportion of 
patent inventions originated in one industry but used in others. 
Then, they estimate the stock of technology in each industry by 
accumulating those flows and assuming a constant obsolescence 
rateo Finally, they analyze the relation between the TFP and the 
stock of R&D within each industry. The conclusions do not differ 
much from those previously mentioned. 
Nevertheless, if spillovers are important, the private rate 
of return of R&D investment will differ from its social rate of 
return and, therefore, its efficiency should be measured taking 
into account the impact on the whole economy and not only on the 
firm or sector conducting the investment. In this sense, two main 
approaches can be found in the literature. The so called 
technology flow approach uses technology flow matrices based on 
patent data or on input-output coefficients to measure spillovers. 
The stock of borrowed R&D of an industry is computed as the 
addition of R&D stock of other industries weighted by the 
purchases of materials and capital from these industries. 
Subsequently, TFP of the industry is regressed on i ts own R&D 
, 
stock and on the borrowed R&D stock. Using this framework 
Terleckyj (1974), Rosenberg and Frischtak (1984) and Jaffe (1989) 
found a positive relation between TFP and borrowed R&D stock. 
The second approach to measure spillovers is the cost 
function approach. The idea is to formulate a cost function, and 
in some cases also an inverse demand function, which depends on 
output, relative price factors and quasi-fixed inputs such as 
physical capital, own R&D capital and other firms and industries 
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R&D capital. within this framework several studies (Bernstein 
(1988), Bernstein and Nadiri (1988, 1989 and 1991» found 
significant spillover effects in some industries, creating a 
dichotomy between the private and social rates of return of R&D 
investment. However, following Griliches (1991), it must be 
stressed the crucial difference exixting between monetary and 
technological spillovers. The first type derives from the fact 
that prices do not capture completely advances in the quality of 
goods, so firms benefit from other firms R&D by buying inputs at 
a price below its marginal productivity. On the contrary, the main 
feature of technological spillovers, the only true spillovers 
according to Griliches, is that they transmit knowledge, which is 
used by other firms to expand the technological frontier. Monetary 
spilllovers stem from trade relations while pure spillovers are 
the result of technical relations. 
In conclusion, despite the problems of measurement there is 
a consensus among researchers about the important role played by 
R&D investment as an engine of economic growth and about the 
existence of technological spillovers. Addi tionally, from the 
empiric~l research some other conclusions can be extracted. First, 
the efficiency of R&D investment seems to vary across industries. 
Secondly, not all industries have the same ability to generate 
spillovers. Thirdly, not all industries have the same capacity to 
absorb spillovers. Fourthly, given the existing dichotomy between 
the social and private rate of return of R&D investment, there is 
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a room for public intervention in the technology field14 , but its 
efficiency will depend on the structure of the economy since as we 
have noted not all industries have the same capacity to absorb and 
propagate technology. 
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
One of the major points of this paper is to stress the lack 
of consensus defining many fields of growth accounting. Its 
methodology has been severely criticized and every single factor 
added to the group of explanatory variables generates a strong 
debate. But, could it be other way? An account of growth is such 
a huge task that it is unavoidable not to be a controversial 
topic. In fact, many fields of economics underlie these studies. 
First, it is necessary to deal with the production function 
and we all know how problematic this issue is. Besides, the income 
distribution and the set of prices will depend upon the form of 
this function. Another question that must be resolved is if long 
run growth in addition to the supply side is also related to the 
, 
demand side and, if so, how? These are only a few examples of the 
problems faced by growth accounting but they serve to illustrate 
the controversial nature of the topic. 
Therefore, since growth accounting seems to rest on a weak 
basis, we may wonder if it is useful to carry out su eh tedious 
14Not only promoting innovation but also promoting diffusion. 
In this sense, see, for example, Geroski (1991). 
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exercises. We think it is useful. Growth accounting has fruitfully 
influenced our understanding of economic growth, although we must 
emphasize that it does not explain it. The pioneering studies 
showed the importance of the residual, which as it is said in 
growth accounting literature mea sures the size of our ignorance. 
A ver y large part of growth needs to be explained. The aggregate 
production function, providing it exists, does not seem to be as 
simple as that of Solow's model but many other factors should be 
taken into account. Moreover, as growth accounting studies 
suggest, these factors are not necessarily the same for all 
countries and some ad-hoc factors must be included. They also 
suggest that it is important to consider social capabilities and 
the institutional framework in order to explain growth. 
However, the persisting large share of the residual has 
forced to deal with the most powerful explanatory variable, 
technology, whose role has be en emphasized in last years and which 
can shed some light on our knowledge of economic growth. In this 
sense, let us conclude by stressing two basic ideas which we think 
can be ver y useful to understand long run growth. The first of 
them is,that the creation and diffusion of knowledge seems to be 
very sensitive to the economic structure of the country (not only 
the composition of output but also the degree of economic and 
social development). This being true, the traditional approach of 
one sector may be not very accurate to specify the determinants of 
growth. Moreover, since the economic structure is not constant, 
the structural change would help us to understand why growth rates 
differ across countries and epochs. The second idea refers to the 
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role of demand as a determinant of growth. All growth accounting 
exercises have been based on a supply approach, according to which 
the increase in output is constrained by the increase in inputs. 
Yet, most of modern economies seem not to be supply constrained. 
Quite to the contrary, during long periods of time there is not 
full employment of resources. This being so, industrial economies 
seems to be demand constrained rather than supply constrained, 
which forces to deal with the role of demand in order to explain 
growth. As pointed out by Kaldor, an increase in demand may induce 
not only to a greater utilization of resources but also to an 
improvement of productivity. In other words, if demand affects the 
level of knowledge, its role is of the utmost importance to 
explain growth. 
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